Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2011

Susie Strohm and Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, v.
ClearOne Communication : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Milo Steven Marsden; Cameron M. Hancock; William Michael Jr; Dorsey and Whitney LLP;
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
James E. Magleby; Christopher M. Von Maack; Jennifer Fraser Parrish; Magleby and Greenwood,
PC; Brian S. Cousin; Neil A. Capobianco; SNR Denton US LLP; Attorneys for Defendant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Strohm v. ClearOne Communication, No. 20110569.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3127

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
SUSIE STROHM AND DORSEY &
WHITNEY, LLP,

|

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AND BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE

Plaintiffs and Appellees/CrossAppellants,

I

v.
/CLEARONE COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant/CrossAppellee.

Appellate Case No. 20110569 SC

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah
Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Case No. 080917500
Milo Steven Marsden
marsden.steve@dorsey.com
Cameron M. Hancock
Hancock.cameron@dorsey.com
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP

136 South Main Street, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655
William Michael, Jr. (Pro Hac Vice)
michael.william@dorsey.com
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP

James E. Magleby (7247)
magleby@mgpcl.aw.com
Christopher M. Von Maack (10468)
vonmaack@mgpclaw.com
Jennifer Fraser Parrish (11207)
parrish@mgpclaw.com
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P . C .

170 South Main Street, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3605
Telephone: 801.359.9000
Facsimile: 801.359.9011

50 South Sixth Street, Suite 1500
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Brian S. Cousin (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
brian.cousin@snrdenton.com
Neil A. Capobianco (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
neil.capobianco@snrdenton.com
Appellees/Cross-Appellants Susie Strohm
SNR DENTON US LLP
and Dorsey & Whitney LLP
1221 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 2500
New York, New York 10020
Telephone: 212.398.5781
Facsimile: 917.768.6800
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant/Cross-Appellee ClearOne
Communications, Inc.
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FEB 2 1 2012

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
SUSIE STROHM AND DORSEY &
WHITNEY, LLP,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AND BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE

Plaintiffs and Appellees/CrossAppellants,
v.
CLEARONE COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant/CrossAppellee.

Appellate Case No. 20110569 SC

Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah
Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Case No. 080917500
Milo Steven Marsden
marsden.steve@dorsey.com
Cameron M. Hancock
Hancockxameron@dorsey.com
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP

136 South Main Street, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1655
William Michael, Jr. (Pro Hac Vice)
michael.william@dorsey.com
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP

James E. Magleby (7247)
magleby@mgpclaw.com
Christopher M. Von Maack (10468)
vonmaack@mgpclaw.com
Jennifer Fraser Parrish (11207)
parrish@mgpclaw.com
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C.

170 South Main Street, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3605
Telephone: 801.359.9000
Facsimile: 801.359.9011

50 South Sixth Street, Suite 1500
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Brian S. Cousin (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
brian.xousin@snrdenton.coni
Neil A. Capobianco (Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
neilxapobianco@snrdentonxom
Appellees/Cross-Appellants Susie Strohm SNR DENTON US LLP
and Dorsey & Whitney LLP
1221 Avenue of the Americas, Suite 2500
New York, New York 10020
Telephone: 212.398.5781
Facsimile: 917.768.6800
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant/Cross-Appellee ClearOne
Communications, Inc.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Preliminary Statement

1

Argument

2

I.

II.

Dorsey is Not Entitled to Collect Attorney Fees under its Own
Engagement Letter Because Dorsey Did Not "Incur" Fees in
Connection with Such Claim

2

Utah Public Policy Prohibiting the Use of Corporate Funds For
Directors Who Do Not Satisfy the Requisite Standard of Conduct
Applies Equally to Officers as Well

8

A.

B.

III.

There Is No Valid Public Policy Reason Why the Statutory
Standard of Conduct Should Apply Only to Directors, But Not
Officers

8

The Jury's Verdict In a Criminal Case Should be Given
Substantial Weight in Determining Whether Ms. Strohm Met
the Requisite Standard of Conduct

12

Strohm Is Not Entitled To Mandatory Indemnification Since
Clearone's Governing Documents Prohibit Indemnification for
Officers Who Fail to Satisfy the Requisite Standard of Conduct

15

IV.

The District Court Erred in Ordering Discovery of Extrinsic Evidence
of the Engagement Letters, Which Should Have Been Construed as a
Reasonable Client Would Have Construed Them
16

V.

In the Alternative, if Extrinsic Evidence is Relevant, Then Genuine
Issues of Fact Exist and Could Not Be Resolved on Summary
Judgment
A.

17749255W-4

Dorsey Should Not Be Permitted to Rely on the Deposition
Testimony of ClearOne's Ex-CEO Mike Keough Since It
Improperly Met With Keough Prior to His Deposition

18

18

B.

Keough's Deposition Testimony Contained Numerous
Inconsistent and Conclusory Statements that Should Not Have
Been Relied Upon by the District Court
23

C.

Keough's Responses to Plaintiffs' Improperly Leading and
Hypothetical Questions About His Current Interpretation of the
Engagement Letters Are Outside the Scope of His 30(b)(6)
Designation and Are Inadmissible
27

i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

VI.

VII.

D.

The True Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Execution
of the Dorsey Engagement Letter Demonstrates that Marsden
Was Only Engaged to Finish Up the Minor Then-Pending Civil
Litigations
30

E.

Keough's Testimonial Responses to Objectionable Leading
Questions Allegedly Designed to Have Him Recall What He
Understood Years Ago About Legal Document Where the Risk
of Supplying a False Memory for a Disgruntled Witness Is So
Great Should Have Been Disregarded
35

An 18% Interest Rate in an Attorney Engagement Letter Is
Unreasonable and thus Unenforceable as a Matter of Utah Public
Policy as Defined in the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

37

Dorsey's Cross-Appeal Should Be Dismissed

41

A.

At a Minimum, Strohm's Conduct Failures Prohibit ClearOne
from Paying Post-Verdict Fees Incurred Solely Because of Her
Perjury Conviction
41

B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Determining That Dorsey's Reasonable Fees in the Collection
Case Needed to Stop as of August 10, 2010

C.

The District Court Did Not Err by Concluding that Dorsey's
Civil Fees to Collect on Its Own Engagement Letter Were Not
Billed in Connection with the SEC Civil Case or Any Related
Litigation
44

Conclusion

17749255W-4

43

45

ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)
CASES

Bekins Bar VRanch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1983)

40

Biondi v. Beekman Hill House Apt. Corp.,
94 N.Y.2d 659, 731 N.E.2d 577, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861 (2000)

12

Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991)

23

Equitex, Inc. v. Ungar, 60 P.3d 746 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002)

12

Falchenberg v. New York State Dep't ofEduc, 567 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N. Y. 2008)

28

Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 34 P.3d 194 (Utah 2001)
Gates v. City of Memphis,
No. 98-5921, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6713 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2000)
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson,
923 P.2d 1366 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1996)

21, 22,23
29
passim

Oberhanslyv. Sprouse, 751 P.2d 1155 (Utah App. 1988)

24

Okelberry v. West Daniels Land Assoc,
2005 UT App. 327,120 P.3d 24 (Utah Ct. App. 2005)

15

People v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207 (Colo. 2001)

12

Porter v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 133 N.C. App. 23 (N.C. App. 1999)

21

Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

15

Salaam v. N.C. Dept. Of Trans., 122 N.C. App. 83 (1996)

21

Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University,
2000 UT 46, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah Sup. Ct. 2000)

2, 3,4, 5

State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1989)

29

Tomsic v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1472 (10th Cir. 1996)

24

U.S. v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999)

36

U.S. v. Strohm, 2011 WL 5346069 (10th Cir. Nov. 8,2011)

iii
17749255W-4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1, 13, 14,42

i

U.S. v. Weissman,
No. S2 94 Cr. 760 (CSH), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8540 (S.D.N.Y. June 16,1997)

12

Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'I Cos. 842 P.2d 865 (Utah 1992)

24

Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983)

24,25

Woods v. Lecureaux, 110 F.3d 1215 (6th Cir. 1997)

29

STATUTES

Utah Code § 16-10a-901 etseq

".

Utah Code § 16-10a-902

15
10,11

Utah Code §16-10a-902(l)

11

Utah Code § 16-10a-903

10,16

Utah Code § 16-10a-904

10

Utah Code § 16-10a-905

10

Utah Code § 16-10a-906

10

Utah Code §16-10a-907(l)

10

Utah Code § 16-10a-907(2)

9,10

Utah Code § 16-10a-907(3)

9,10

OTHER AUTHORITIES

4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 611.06[2][a], at 611-59 (2ded. 2009)

35

4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 611.06[4], at 611-64 (2ded. 2009)

36

Fed. Rule of Evidence 611(c)

29

Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 18(2) (2000)
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 34 (2000)
Utah R. Civ. Proc. 30(b)(6)

17, 39
38
19, 28

Utah R. Civ. Proc. 32(a)

29

Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c)

23

iv
17749255W-4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.5(a)
Rule 4.2
Rule 4.2(d)
Rule 4.2(d)(1)
Rule 4.2(d)(l)(B)(ii), (iii)

37
18, 19, 20, 23
20
19,20
20

Utah State Bar Eth Advisory Committee Op. 96-09, 1996 WL 647336, at *2

V
17749255W-4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiff and Appellee Dorsey & Whitney, LLP ("Dorsey") fails to come to terms
with Jones, Waldo's prohibition on pro se attorneys' fees and falsely claims it was
essentially overruled. Since Dorsey did not "incur" fees in connection with its own
engagement letter claim, it is not entitled to recover any attorneys' fees on that claim.
Moreover, Utah's public policy prohibiting the use of corporate funds for directors
who do not satisfy the requisite standard of conduct applies equally to officers - like
Strohm, whose felony perjury conviction was recently affirmed. U.S. v. Strohm, 2011
WL 5346069, at *1, *12 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 2011). Furthermore, Strohm is not entitled to
mandatory indemnification for the same reason since ClearOne's governing documents
prohibit it.
Since the Bendinger and Dorsey engagement letters should have been construed as
a reasonable client would have construed them, the district court erred in ordering
discovery of extrinsic evidence. A reasonable client would not have construed the
Dorsey engagement letter as incorporating any terms from the Bendinger engagement
letter, and certainly not the most controversial terms regarding attorneys' fees and an
18% interest rate.
In the alternative, if extrinsic evidence is relevant, then genuine issues of fact exist
and could not have been resolved on summary judgment. Dorsey, and the district court,
erroneously relied upon the deposition testimony of ClearOne's former and disgruntled
CEO (Mike Keough), whose testimony was inconsistent and primarily involved
1
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responding to improperly leading and hypothetical questions. At a minimum, Keough's
bias and credibility must be determined in open court, not on summary judgment.
Additionally, the 18% interest rate applied by the district court is per se
unreasonable and violative of Utah ethics rules prohibiting attorneys from charging an
unreasonable fee. The district court erred by applying an "unconscionability" standard
applicable to commercial contracts.
Finally, Dorsey's cross-appeal should be dismissed since the district court
correctly found that Utah public policy prohibits indemnification with respect to the
felony perjury count on which Strohm was convicted and thus failed to satisfy the
requisite standard of conduct. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in
determining that Dorsey's reasonable fees in its collection case should be cut off as of
August 10, 2010 or that the 18% interest rate did not apply to the collection case fees.
ARGUMENT
I.
DORSEY is NOT ENTITLED TO COLLECT
ATTORNEY FEES UNDER ITS OWN ENGAGEMENT LETTER
BECAUSE DORSEY DID NOT "INCUR" FEES IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH CLAIM

Jones, Waldo held that a law firm is not entitled to attorneys' fees in its pro se
collection action even if the agreement includes an attorneys' fees provision. Jones,
Waldo, Holhrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1996).
Appellee Dorsey attempts to limit Jones, Waldo to its facts and contends - falsely - that
Jones, Waldo was essentially overruled by Softsolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young
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University, 2000 UT 46, 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah Sup. Ct. 2000) (Dorsey Br. 39-40). Dorsey's
attempts at obfiiscation should be rejected.
Softsolutions held that "a nonlegal organization [such as an educational institution]
can recover attorney fees when it uses the services of salaried in-house counsel," albeit
not on a market rate basis. 2000 UT 46, 1fl['44, 51. Here, Dorsey is clearly a legal
organization - that is, "an organization primarily engaged in providing legal services."
Id. Dorsey is a law firm attempting to collect attorneys' fees in a pro se collection action
by using its own attorneys. Accordingly, Dorsey is not entitled to fees.
Softsolutions summarized Utah caselaw explaining this public policy as follows:
In Batchelor, we held that a pro se attorney-litigant is not
entitled to recover attorney fees for successful litigation. See
Batchelor, 832 P.2d at 473. Likewise in Jones, Waldo, we
held that a pro se law firm-litigant could not recover attorney
fees in enforcing an agreement. See Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d
at 1375. In refusing to award attorney fees in these cases, we
focused on the important fact that the litigants were both in
the business of providing legal services and thus did not
"incur" attorney fees as a lay individual or nonlegal
organization would. See Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d at 1375
(stating "it is by no means self-evident that the time a lawyer
spends on his own case represents fees 'incurred'"). That is,
neither the law firm nor the attorney-litigant actually paid
or became liable to pay consideration in exchange for
legal representation and thus did not incur attorney fees
in the action. It was not the fact that they were pro se that
precluded them from recovery. Rather, it was the fact that
they were lawyers representing themselves, and therefore
did not incur attorney fees.
2000 UT 46, Tf 43 (emphasis added). In this case, Dorsey represented itself in prosecuting
its Dorsey engagement letter claim - indeed, that is why Dorsey named itself as a
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<

Plaintiff in this action. As a law firm representing itself, it did not "incur" legal fees
because it did not actually pay or become liable to pay consideration in exchange for its
representation of itself.
Additionally, Dorsey's suggestion that Strohm somehow became liable to pay
Dorsey's collection action fees and that Strohm has therefore "incurred" attorneys' fees
in the collection action (Dorsey Br. 41-42) is false. Dorsey did not sue Strohm to collect
its legal fees - despite the fact that she is purportedly jointly and severally liable for them
- and thus Strohm did not "incur" or become legally liable to pay Dorsey for its
collection action efforts against ClearOne.1
Softsolutions distinguished Batchelor and Jones, Waldo on the grounds that
Brigham Young University ("BYU") - Softsolutions' adversary - is an educational
institution and not a law firm. Since BYU was not a law firm, it had "incurred" legal fees
and was contractually entitled to recover for the cost of using its own in-house counsel.
2000 UT 46,ffi[44-46. Significantly, however, BYU became entitled to recover only on
a cost-plus basis the proportionate share of the in-house counsel's salary, benefits, and
overhead expenses "allocable to the case based upon the time expended." Id. at ^j 52.
Nothing in Softsolutions suggests that Dorsey - as a law firm - either "incurred"
attorneys' fees or should be entitled to collect them at a market rate.

1

In truth, both ClearOne and Dorsey have assumed throughout this action that Strohm
does not have the financial resources to pay Dorsey's fees in any material way.
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Thus, the public policy justifications precluding a law firm from recovering its
own attorneys' fees in a collection action remain fully in tact after Softsolutions.
Therefore, the district court erred by allowing Dorsey to collect attorneys' fees in
connection with its engagement letter claim by pointing to factual distinctions between
Jones, Waldo and the instant case. Those factual distinctions are irrelevant to the public
policy justifications articulated in Batchelor and Jones, Waldo and reiterated in
Softsolutions. In sum, since Dorsey did not actually pay or become liable to pay for
representing itself on the Dorsey engagement letter claim, Dorsey did not "incur"
attorneys' fees on that claim and is therefore not entitled to collect them from ClearOne.
The fact that Dorsey also represented Strohm on other claims in this case is
irrelevant. Strohm was only successful on her mandatory indemnification claim, which
was not added to Plaintiffs' complaint in this case until after the jury's verdict in the
criminal case against her and required no discovery. While Strohm may be entitled to
collect the fees incurred in successfully prosecuting her mandatory indemnification
claim, all of the fees sought by Dorsey relating to time expended on the other claims in
this case are non-compensable.
One of the public policy concerns expressed in Jones, Waldo that is relevant here
relates to ClearOne's role as a "captive client." When ClearOne was sued by Dorsey,
ClearOne had "no control over the amount of time the [Dorsey] attorney [s] will spend or
how it will be spent. And [Dorsey] has no motivation to explore less expensive
collection alternatives." Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d at 1374-75. Based on the ultimate

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

(

Judgment entered by the district court, Dorsey expended $865,490 (at market rates) on
the collection action to collect $972,737 in unpaid criminal defense fees (R. 5310-12).
(ClearOne had already paid Dorsey $1,297,072 prior to Dorsey's commencement of its
collection action (R. 5155)). Jones, Waldo's expressed concern about creating "a new
incentive to lawyers to increase their fees" or "a 'cottage industry' for claimants ... as a
way to generate fees rather than to vindicate personal claims" is thus manifestly present
in this case. Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d at 1375. Dorsey's complaint that it would have to
hire separate counsel to collect fees pursuant to Dorsey's own engagement letter (Dorsey
Br. 41) proves the point. Dorsey never would have paid a separate law firm $865,490 to
collect what amounted to $972,737 in unpaid criminal action fees. For this reason alone,
Dorsey should not be permitted to collect any fees in connection with its engagement
letter claim.
Despite Dorsey's - and the district court's - attempts to confine Jones, Waldo to
its "disturbing" facts (Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d at 1375), Jones, Waldo based its
prohibition on law firms collecting attorneys' fees in their own collection actions on the
following public policy grounds:
1.

"[P]ro se litigants should not recover attorney fees...."

2.

"[The Court's most serious concern is] [a] captive client [in a collection
action brought by an attorney representing himself] ... has no control over
the amount of time the attorney will spend or how it will be spent. And
plaintiff has no motivation to explore less expensive collection
alternatives."

3.

"It is our view that a law firm does not 'incur' fees when it uses its own
attorneys in a collection action."
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4.

"[W]e here reaffirm our view that the ability to competently present the
claim without retained counsel is a sufficient advantage for a lawyerlitigant. We remain loath to enhance that advantage by giving the lawyerlitigant recovery not only as a successful party, but also as that party's
attorney."

Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374-75 (Utah Sup.
Ct. 1996). Each of these concerns is equally present in the case at bar.
Lastly, as pointed out in ClearOne's opening brief, the Utah State Bar has issued
an ethics advisory opinion clearly stating that "a law firm may not collect attorney's fees
in a collection action in which the firm uses its own lawyers to collect debts of the firm"
(ClearOne Br. 13). In doing so, the Ethics Opinion further cautions that "[ajttorneys ...
be aware of the provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct that prohibit behavior
that could mislead the court as to the attorney's right to collect these fees." Utah State
Bar Eth. Advisory Committee Op. 96-09, 1996 WL 647336, at *2 (Utah St. Bar Nov. 1,
1996).
In sum, pursuant to the Jones, Waldo rule, Dorsey is not entitled to collect
attorneys' fees in connection with its pro se collection action against ClearOne. With
respect to its Dorsey engagement letter claim, Dorsey is representing itself- not Strohm
- and is therefore pro se and did not "incur" or otherwise become liable for attorneys'
fees. Since Dorsey used its own attorneys in the instant collection action against
ClearOne, and is seeking to collect pursuant to an engagement letter which it claims has
an attorneys' fees provision, Dorsey is not entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to the
Dorsey engagement letter for public policy reasons. Accordingly, for the reasons set
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forth herein and in ClearOne's main brief, the district court erred by allowing Dorsey to
collect - at market rates, no less - attorneys' fees in connection with its own Dorsey
engagement letter claim.
II.
UTAH PUBLIC POLICY PROHIBITING THE USE OF
CORPORATE FUNDS FOR DIRECTORS W H O D O NOT SATISFY THE
REQUISITE STANDARD OF CONDUCT APPLIES EQUALLY TO OFFICERS AS W E L L

A.

There Is No Valid Public Policy Reason Why the Statutory
Standard of Conduct Should Apply Only to Directors, But Not Officers
Dorsey does not dispute that Utah public policy can preclude enforcement of the

Dorsey engagement letter, nor does it dispute that Utah public policy is expressed in the
Utah Revised Business Corporation Act - at least insofar as corporate directors are
concerned (Dorsey Br. 42-46). Dorsey erroneously contends, however, that Utah public
policy prohibiting the use of corporate funds for corporate directors who do not satisfy
the requisite standard of conduct does not apply to corporate officers (id. at 43-45).
Nothing could be further from the truth. Dorsey offers no valid public policy reason why
corporate funds may not be used to defend directors but may be used to defend officers
who do not satisfy the applicable standard of conduct.
Can Dorsey realistically contend that an officer who acts in bad faith, in
derogation of the best interests of the corporation, and/or with reasonable cause to believe
that her conduct was unlawful should be entitled to corporate funds to defend such
conduct? Granted, prior to any jury verdict, a corporation may not have sufficient
information to determine whether the officer met the requisite standard. Indeed, Dorsey
was paid $1,297,072 prior to the verdict in the criminal case (R. 5155). However, after a
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criminal verdict establishing that the standard of conduct was not satisfied, there should
be no doubt. Dorsey can point to no legislative history or Official Commentary
suggesting that an officer can be indemnified under such known bad conduct
circumstances - circumstances that would prohibit a director from being indemnified.
Dorsey points to Section 907(3) of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act,
which states - after Section 907(2) provides that a corporation may indemnify and
advance expenses to an officer to the same extent as a director - as follows:
[a] corporation may also indemnify and advance expenses to
an officer ... who is not a director to a greater extent, if not
inconsistent with public policy, and if provided for by its
articles of incorporation, bylaws, general or specific action
of its board of directors, or contract.
Utah Code § 16-10a-907(3) (emphasis added) (Dorsey Br. 43-44). While this provision
expressly authorizes a Utah corporation to advance expenses to a non-director officer to a
greater extent than an director, such greater extent is expressly limited by public policy.
As the Official Commentary to this section notes: "[i]n effect, this leaves public policy
determinations as to what are permissible limits, in a particular case, to the courts."
Official Commentary, at 908.
So what are the public policy limitations imposed on corporate officers in Utah?
Dorsey apparently contends that there are none. However, public policy can be discerned
from the structure and logic behind a statute. Based on the structure of the statute, there
is no plausible reason to believe that the requisite standard of conduct does not impose a
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public policy limitation on officers to the same extent as directors. The indemnification
statute is structured as follows:
1.

Standards for the indemnification and advancement of directors (Utah Code
§§ 16-10a-902, 16-10a-904);

2.

Mandatory indemnification standard for directors (Utah Code § 16-10a903);

3.

Authorization for courts to order indemnification for directors (Utah Code
§ 16-10a-905); and

4.

Required corporate procedures for advancement or indemnification of
directors (Utah Code §16-1 Oa-906).

After all of these standards are set forth for corporate directors, Section 907
authorizes Utah corporations to indemnify and advance expenses to "an officer,
employee, fiduciary, or agent of the corporation." Utah Code § 16-10a-907(2,3). Thus, a
corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws may address the issue, or the issue is
delegated to the corporation's Board of Directors. Notably, it is only a corporate officer
that is entitled to statutory mandatory indemnification and court-ordered indemnification
to the same extent as a director. Utah Code § 16-10a-907(l).
The primary reason for separating the treatment of directors and officers under the
statute is that there are conflict of interest issues that arise if a director is required to
determine his or her own entitlement to indemnification or advancement under the
statute. However, the Utah legislature has not authorized greater indemnification or
advancement rights for officers in order to avoid the public policy of requiring
compliance with the requisite standard of conduct as a condition of receiving such rights.
In fact, it would likely be a breach of fiduciary duty for a corporation's board to authorize
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indemnification or advancement for an officer that cannot satisfy the requisite standard of
conduct. ClearOne respectfully submits that Utah public policy prohibits the use of
corporate funds to indemnify a corporate director or officer where, based on a jury
determination, it is clear that she: (1) did not act in good faith, (2) did not reasonably
believe that her conduct was in, or not opposed to, the corporation's best interests, and
(3) had reasonable cause to believe her conduct was unlawful. Utah Code § 16-10a902(1).
Indeed, Marsden negotiated Strohm's Employment Termination Agreement prior
to entering into the Dorsey engagement letter. As such, Marsden was aware that
ClearOne's obligation to indemnify Strohm was "[s]ubject to the limitations imposed by
Utah Code Ann. S 16-10a-902 and the Company's articles of incorporation and bylaws"
(R. 37 at 18). Thus, Dorsey was aware that Section 902 - and the standards of conduct
articulated in subparagraph 1 thereof- applied to Strohm. Moreover, Strohm herself was
required to (and did) aver in her Undertakings to the company that she had satisfied the
requisite standard of conduct (R. 2063-67). Neither Strohm nor her counsel at the time,
Dorsey, took the position in her Undertakings to the company that she was somehow
exempt from satisfying the requisite standard of conduct. Therefore, Dorsey cannot
contend that it was unaware of the public policy limitations imposed by Utah law on the
corporate officer that it represented.
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B.

The Jury's Verdict In a Criminal Case Should be Given Substantial Weight
in Determining Whether Ms. Strohm Met the Requisite Standard of Conduct
Dorsey points to Section 16-10a-902(3) for the proposition that "termination of a

proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere
or its equivalent is not, of itself, determinative that the director did not meet the standard
of conduct" (Dorsey Br. 44-45) (emphasis added). ClearOne, however, issued a
corporate resolution determining that, in view of the Court's instructions to the jury and
Strohm's conviction, Strohm had failed to satisfy the requisite standard of conduct
(R. 2082-83). Moreover, the relevant caselaw routinely draws conclusions about whether
the requisite standard of conduct has been met by analyzing the nature of the crime or
liability finding at issue. See U.S. v. Weissman, No. S2 94 Cr. 760 (CSH), 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8540, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1997) (Weissman's "perjury conviction
was necessarily premised on a finding by the jury that he engaged in 'deliberate
dishonesty.'"); Equitex, Inc. v. Ungar, 60 P.3d 746, 751 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) ("The
intentional and willful nature of defendant's actions precludes a finding that he acted in
good faith."); Biondi v. Beekman Hill House Apt. Corp., 94 N.Y.2d 659, 667, 731 N.E.2d
577, 581, 709 N.Y.S.2d 861, 865 (2000) ("Because the underlying Federal judgment
establishes that Biondi's acts were committed in bad faith, Biondi is not entitled to
indemnification and cannot relitigate the good faith versus bad faith issue here."); People
v. Kazmierski, 25 P.3d 1207, 1214 (Colo.. 2001) ("False statements, either intentionally or
recklessly made, are the antithesis of good faith.").
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Indeed, the Official Commentary to Section 16-10a-902(3) describes that section's
purpose as follows:
The purpose of section 902(3) is to reject the argument that
indemnification is automatically improper whenever a
proceeding has been terminated on a basis that does not
exonerate the director claiming indemnification. Even though
a final judgment or conviction is not automatically
determinative of the issue whether the minimum standard of
conduct was met, any judicial determination of substantive
liability would in most instances be entitled to considerable
weight.
Official Commentary to Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, at § 902(3) (emphasis
added). Thus, while some findings of liability and/or other findings of non-exoneration
may not necessarily be inconsistent with a determination that the standard of conduct was
met, judicial determinations of substantive liability are "in most instances" "entitled to
considerable weight" and may, in fact, establish that the requisite standard of conduct
was not met. Since Strohm intentionally and knowingly made false statements under
oath on a material matter in federal court - and such conduct was judicially determined
by a unanimous jury verdict finding her guilty of felony perjury - she cannot meet the
requisite good faith standard.
Moreover, it is unclear precisely what Dorsey is contending is additionally
required before Strohm could actually be deemed not to have satisfied the requisite
standard of conduct (Dorsey Br. 45). If a jury conviction in a criminal case on a federal
perjury charge dealing specifically with matters related to the company - where a
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unanimous verdict of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required - is not sufficient, it is
hard to know what else could possibly be required. Dorsey, tellingly, does not say.
In any event, the Tenth Circuit has now affirmed Strohm's criminal conviction.
See U.S. v. Strohm, 2011 WL 5346069, at *1, *12 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 2011). For purposes
of showing the underlying circumstances of Strohm's conviction, the Tenth Circuit's
decision made the following findings and holdings:
•

When asked if she was involved in the sale, she denied involvement. When
asked at what point the same came to [her] attention, she responded that she
did not know whether it was before or after the end of the fiscal year.
Further none of these answers is undisputably true. Her perjury conviction
rests on the conclusion that her answer to the involvement question was false
and there is evidence she was aware of the sale before the end of the fiscal
year. Strohm, 2011 WL 5346069, at *9.

•

Based on the evidence, a rational jury could conclude Strohm knowingly
gave false testimony when she claimed she learned of the Production Audio
Sale either before or after the end of the fiscal year, because she clearly
learned about the sale before the end of the fiscal year. Id. at *10.

•

Strohm argues the government failed to prove her testimony was material to
the district court's decision to grant the SEC's preliminary injunction. We
conclude, however, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find her
testimony regarding past accounting irregularities was capable of affecting
the court's calculus of whether an injuction was necessary to inhibit future
corporate malfeasance by Strohm and other ClearOne officers. Id.

•

A reasonable jury could conclude Strohm's false statements were capable of
influencing the court's decision of whether to enjoin potential future
violations of the securities laws. The government presented sufficient
evidence that Strohm's testimony was material to this point. Id. at *11.

•

Strohm falsely testified that she was not involved in the Production Audio
sale and learned of the sale either before or after the end of the fiscal year. It
is reasonable for a jury to conclude Strohm's testimony denying her past
involvement in the Production Audio sale - an example of ClearOne's
alleged fraudulent accounting practices - was material to the court's
determination of how widespread the problems were at ClearOne and the
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scope of the involvement by senior company executives. Also, it was
reasonable to conclude Strohm's statement that she learned of the
Production Audio sale either before or after the end of fiscal year was
material. Because if she testified she had learned of the sale before the end
of the fiscal year, she either was a part of the decision to improperly
recognize the revenue or at least did nothing to stop the improper
accounting. But her false testimony undercut any such inference. Id.
Accordingly, if there was any doubt that Strohm did not satisfy the standard of
conduct, the Tenth Circuit affirmance of her conviction, given the findings and holdings
set forth above, makes it utterly clear.
In sum, since the jury instructions, the jury's verdict, and the Tenth's Circuit's
affirmance of her conviction establish that Strohm did not satisfy the requisite standard of
conduct, Utah public policy prohibits ClearOne from using any corporate funds to pay for
the attorneys' fees and expenses associated with her defense.
III.
STROHM IS NOT ENTITLED T O MANDATORY INDEMNIFICATION
SINCE CLEARONE'S GOVERNING DOCUMENTS PROHIBIT INDEMNIFICATION
FOR OFFICERS W H O FAIL TO SATISFY THE REQUISITE STANDARD OF CONDUCT

ClearOne's articles of incorporation properly delegate the power for regulation
and management of the corporation to the bylaws. "It is well established precedent that
the bylaws of a corporation, together with the articles of incorporation, the statute under
which it was incorporated, and the members' application, constitute a contract between
the members and the corporation." Okelberry v. West Daniels Land Assoc, 2005 UT
App. 327, If 14, 120 P.3d 24, 39 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (citing to Reedeker v. Salisbury,
952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Accordingly, indemnification of officers is
properly limited in ClearOne's corporate governance documents and Strohm is not
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entitled to mandatory indemnification pursuant to the Utah Revised Business Corporation
Act, Utah Code § 16-1 Oa-901 etseq.
Under ClearOne's corporate governance documents, a director or officer must
satisfy the requisite standard of conduct in order to be indemnified. Strohm failed to
meet the standard of conduct as evidenced by Strohm's perjury conviction and the
affirmance of such conviction by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Accordingly,
Strohm has failed to meet the requisite standard of conduct and is not entitled to
indemnification under Utah law.
Dorsey argues that the district court "ultimately concluded that in light of
Strohm's near-complete success in defending against the criminal charges against her
.. .ClearOne ... had to indemnify Strohm" (Dorsey Br. 27). However, a thorough
understanding of the underlying circumstances surrounding Strohm's felony perjury
conviction, as detailed above, demonstrates that Strohm failed to meet the requisite
standard of conduct. Accordingly, Strohm is not entitled to mandatory indemnification
pursuant to Utah Code §16-1 Oa-903.
IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DISCOVERY OF
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF THE ENGAGEMENT LETTERS, WHICH SHOULD HAVE
BEEN CONSTRUED AS A REASONABLE CLIENT WOULD HAVE CONSTRUED THEM

Having concluded that the engagement letters were ambiguous - at least as to
whether they were intended to cover the federal criminal case - the district court ordered
the parties to conduct discovery to resolve the ambiguity. In the context of an attorney
engagement letter, this was error. While an ordinary commercial contract's ambiguities
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may be resolved by extrinsic evidence, attorneys have an ethical obligation to set forth a
clear statement of what the agreement covers and are bound by how a reasonable client
would have construed the agreement.
Specifically, the Restatement of The Law Governing Lawyers imposes a
"reasonable client" standard of construction on attorney engagement letters:
A tribunal should construe a contract between client and
lawyer as a reasonable person in the circumstances of the
client would have construed it.
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 18(2) (2000). The purpose of this
rule is to "protect clients against unfair contracts and interpretations of them." Id. § 18,
cmt. b.
A reasonable client reviewing the Dorsey engagement letter would not be on
notice that it was intended to incorporate by reference the attorneys' fees and 18%
interest provisions of the Bendinger engagement letter. The Dorsey engagement letter
merely refers to the fact that Marsden has joined a new law firm and that "[o]ur
engagement letter needs to be updated to reflect this move" (R. 47). Nowhere does the
Dorsey engagement letter inform the reasonable client that any term of the Bendinger
engagement letter is being incorporated by reference.
The district court improperly ignored the strict "incorporation by reference" rules
by construing the Bendinger and Dorsey engagement letters as one agreement. Since one
agreement is with Bendinger and the other agreement is with Dorsey, they cannot legally
form one agreement. As such, the Dorsey engagement letter needed to specifically state
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which terms, if any, from the Bendinger letter it intended to incorporate by reference into
the Dorsey letter.
Since the district court erred in ordering the examination of extrinsic evidence
instead of construing the Dorsey engagement letter as a reasonable client would have
construed it, the district court's holdings that ClearOne is liable for civil case attorneys
fees and an 18% interest rate on the criminal case should be reversed.
V.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
IS RELEVANT, THEN GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT EXIST
AND COULD NOT BE RESOLVED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dorsey argues that "the proper interpretation of the Agreements became an issue
of fact, and the court correctly turned to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent
.... The most crucial evidence was the deposition of Michael Keough" (Dorsey Br. 30).
However, for the reasons set forth below, the lower court erroneously relied on Keough's
deposition testimony to "clarify" the ambiguity in the Bendinger and Dorsey engagement
letters.
A.

Dorsey Should Not Be Permitted to Rely on the Deposition Testimony of
ClearOne's Ex-CEO Mike Keough Since It Improperly Met With Keough
Prior to His Deposition
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) General Rule. In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation with a
person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer
in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an attorney may,
without such prior consent, communicate with another's
client if authorized to do so by any law, rule, or court order,
in which event the communication shall be strictly restricted
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to that allowed by the law, rule or court order, or as
authorized by paragraphs (b), (c), (d) or (e) of this Rule.

(d) Organizations as Represented Persons.
(d)(1) When the represented person is an organization, an
individual is represented by counsel for the organization if the
individual is not separately represented with respect to the
subject matter of the communication, and
SjC

9|C

5j»

5JC

9|C

(d)(l)(B)(ii) a representative of the organization whose acts
or omissions in the matter may be imputed to the organization
under applicable law; or
(d)(l)(B)(iii) a representative of the organization whose
statements under applicable rules of evidence would have the
effect of binding the organization with respect to proof of the
matter.
Utah Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 4.2
In the present case, ClearOne has at all relevant times been represented by counsel
in connection with this litigation. Since ClearOne is an organization, pursuant to Rule
4.2(d)(1), Keough is deemed to be represented by ClearOne's counsel if he "is not
separately represented with respect to the subject matter of the communication" and he is
a representative of the organization "whose acts or omissions in the matter may be
imputed to the organization under applicable law" or "whose statements under applicable
rules of evidence would have the effect of binding the organization with respect to proof
of the matter."
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Keough was ClearOne's CEO in 2003 and 2004 and was the person who signed
the Bendinger engagement letter, the Strohm Employment Termination Agreement, and
the Dorsey engagement letter on behalf of ClearOne (R. 35-40; 2836-40; 2842-45). In
this litigation, ClearOne designated Keough as its Rule 30(b)(6) witness with respect the
issue of the negotiation and execution of these agreements (R. 1143-48). In addition,
Keough testified at his deposition that he was not represented by separate counsel
(R.2699). Keough also testified at his deposition that he met with Dorsey partner Steve
Marsden, Esq. prior to his deposition in this case (R.2701).
Under Rule 4.2(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, since Keough
was not represented by separate counsel, he was deemed to be a person "represented by
counsel for the organization [ClearOne]" for purposes of Rule 4.2. Id.
During his deposition, Keough testified that Dorsey partner, Marsden, and he
engaged in ex parte communications related to the Strohm matter prior to his deposition
(R. 2701). There is no record evidence that the plaintiffs sought or received permission
from ClearOne or its attorneys to meet with Keough ex parte. In their motion for
summary judgment below, the plaintiffs relied heavily on Keough's testimony regarding
what Keough originally understood the Bendinger and Dorsey engagement letters to
mean on January 29, 2003 and March 31, 2004 (when he originally signed them) to bind
ClearOne at summary judgment, thereby treating Keough as a representative of ClearOne
pursuant to Rule 4.2(d)(l)(B)(ii), (iii). Indeed, Dorsey attempts to utilize Keough's
deposition testimony to bind ClearOne with respect to all the areas of Keough's
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testimony - areas going well beyond the scope of Keough's 30(b)(6) designation (Dorsey
Br. 12-14, 30, 32, 34-35, 48).
Under 4.2(d) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Dorsey & Whitney's ex
parte communications with Keough were improper and it would, therefore, be unfair
under the circumstances for the Court to sustain Keough's deposition testimony as the
primary "extrinsic evidence" supporting Dorsey's claim that the scope of the Bendinger
letter was intended to include criminal defense fees.
Indeed, any testimony elicited as a result of the improper ex parte communication
between Keough and Dorsey should have been excluded from the lower court's summary
judgment analysis. See Salaam v. N.C. Dept. Of Trans., 122 N.C. App. 83, 88 (1996),
disc, review improvidently allowed, 345 N.C. 494 (1997)(doctor's deposition testimony
must be excluded where defense counsel engaged in ex parte communication with doctor
prior to deposition); Porter v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., 133 N.C. App. 23, 30 (N.C. App.
1999) (holding Industrial Commission must exclude portions of deposition testimony
tainted by ex parte communication between treating physician and defense counsel).
This Court has consistently supported corrective measures to address improperly
obtained testimony from inappropriate ex parte communications between an attorney and
an adverse corporate representative whose statements could impute liability to the
corporation. See Feather stone v. Schaerrer, 34 P.3d 194, 206 (Utah Sup. Ct. 2001)(
plaintiffs attorney engaged in improper ex parte communication with corporate
representative of defendant organization, which had been recorded and transcribed, and

21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

held that the work product privilege was vitiated by attorney's ethical violation and
ordered disclosure of transcript of ex parte communication).
Accordingly, in the event that the Court deems Keough's testimony determinative
or persuasive with respect to the interpretation of the engagement letters, the Court
should reverse the summary judgment decision of the lower court and remand the case
back to the district court for a hearing with respect to both Dorsey's improper ex parte
communications with Keough and Keough's actual testimony so that the district court
judge will have an opportunity to fairly assess the credibility of Keough's testimony and
the extent to which it should be imputed to ClearOne in this case.
Reversal and remand for a hearing would be consistent with this Court's
affirmation in Featherstone, as it would require the content of the improper ex parte
communications, and the resulting infections caused to Keough's deposition testimony, to
be divulged to ClearOne. In Featherstone, the defendant corporation's representative,
who was a represented party for purposes of the rule prohibiting ex parte communications
with a party represented by another lawyer in the matter (as Keough is here), participated
in a telephone conversation with the Plaintiffs attorney and agreed to allow that
conversation to be recorded. Id. at 196. During this conversation, the plaintiffs attorney
questioned the defendant's representative about a number of issues that were central to
the case. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiffs counsel conducted the deposition of the
representative and, during the deposition, began to use a transcript of the prior
communication for cross-examination purposes. Id. at 197.
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Following revelation of this ex parte communication, the defense counsel in
Feather stone objected to use of the transcript, adjourned the deposition, and requested a
copy of the transcript, to which plaintiffs attorney replied that they were "not entitled to
the transcript." Id. Defendant thereafter moved in the trial court for a determination that
plaintiffs counsel violated Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 and to compel
production of the recorded conversation. Id.
The trial court determined, and this Court affirmed, that such conduct amounted to
an ethical violation and an improper ex parte communication. In order to rectify
plaintiffs counsel's infractions, the trial court ordered full discovery of the ex parte
communication so that defendant could determine the full extent of the improprieties and
influence over the representative's testimony. Id. at 206.
Therefore, in accordance with Featherstone, this Court should determine that
Dorsey's communications with Keough were improper ex parte communications and
reverse the summary judgment decision of the lower court so that full discovery may be
conducted regarding the extent of such communications and their influence over
Keough's deposition testimony.
B.

Keough's Deposition Testimony Contained Numerous Inconsistent and
Conclusory Statements that Should Not Have Been Relied Upon by the
District Court
"Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(c). "In determining whether the lower court correctly found that there was
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no genuine issue of material fact, [this Court should] view the facts and inferences to be
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party." Dwiggins v. Morgan
Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991). In other words, this Court should "review the
factual submissions to the trial court in a light most favorable to finding a material issue
of fact." Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l Cos. 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992).
As Keough's deposition testimony contained numerous inconsistent and
conclusory statements, the trial court improperly relied upon such testimony and
erroneously granted summary judgment to Dorsey. See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170,
1172-73 (Utah 1983) (where plaintiffs deposition testimony and subsequent affidavit,
which were submitted in opposition to defendant's summary judgment motion, were
inconsistent and conclusory, this Court affirmed the trial court's disregard of inconsistent
and non-fact specific affidavit statements).
As set forth herein, the plaintiffs have utilized Keough's deposition testimonyboth in the lower court and on this appeal - in an improper attempt to bind ClearOne.
Among other things, Keough's testimony is clearly inconsistent as to whether the
Bendinger engagement letter was intended to cover criminal defense fees. The internal
inconsistency of Keough's testimony should have been appreciated by the lower court
and, at the very least, created a material issue of fact such that summary judgment in
Dorsey's favor was improper. See Oberhansly v. Sprouse, 751 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah
App. 1988) (Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment granted to defendant by trial
court, where it found evidence relied upon by lower court to have been non-dispositive
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and where genuine issue as to original parties' intent behind executed documents
existed.); see also Tomsic v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1472, 1479-80
(10th Cir. 1996) (Court of Appeals reversed District Court of Utah's grant of summary
judgment upon finding that district court erred when it held that plaintiffs had failed to
produce evidence to withstand summary judgment when defendants' record statements as
to criteria used to evaluate plaintiffs performance were inconsistent and subjective).
Although it was not the province of the lower court, on a motion for summary
judgment, to assess Keough's credibility per se, Keough's deposition testimony was so
internally inconsistent and unreliable that it was improper for the lower court to rely on
that testimony as "extrinsic" evidence that clarified the ambiguity with respect to the
engagement letters. See Webster, 675 P.2d at 1172-73 (affirming trial court's disregard
of inconsistent and non-fact specific deposition and affidavit statements).
According to Keough, at the time the Bendinger letter agreement was entered into
"there weren't any criminal things going on" (R. 2714), and "the focus was clearly on the
SEC issue" (R. 2734). In fact, Keough testified that he could not recall a single
conversation with any of ClearOne's directors or its attorneys, prior to the signing of the
Bendinger engagement letter, where they "discussed the possibility of a criminal charge
against Susie Strohm" (R. 2735). Keough further testified that, in December 2003, prior
to the signing of the Employment Termination Agreement between Strohm and
ClearOne, and nearly a year after the signing of the Bendinger engagement letter, "Susie
[Strohm]...came to ClearOne and [asked] for formal indemnification and advancement
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payment of [her] fees in defense of the criminal action and SEC action..." (R. 2714).
However, if the scope of the Bendinger engagement letter was intended to include the
payment of Strohm's then potential criminal defense fees, there would have been no need
for Strohm to come to ClearOne in December 2003 to ask for indemnification and
advancement of her fees in defense of the criminal action.
Furthermore, when Keough was specifically asked about the meaning of the
phrase in the Bendinger engagement letter "further related investigation and litigation,"
he testified that "[i]t was early on and I don't think anybody knew what would spawn
from that" (R. 2726). This testimony certainly does not support the notion that, in
signing on to the Bendinger engagement letter, ClearOne was agreeing to pay for any and
all future criminal defense work performed by the Bendinger firm on behalf of Strohm.
In addition, according to Keough, he was not even the correct person to ask about the
intent of the parties in signing the Bendinger engagement letter since he "was not
involved in any.. .of the negotiations" and, therefore, was not made privy to "[w]hat was
going to be offered..." (R. 2733). In fact, Keough did not discuss the Bendinger
engagement letter with Strohm or Marsden. Id. According to Keough, the extent of what
was being offered by ClearOne through the Bendinger engagement letter "was really
driven at the board level and between [the directors] and legal counsel at the time." Id.
Accordingly, because Keough's deposition testimony is anything but clear with
respect to whether the parties intended the scope of the Bendinger engagement letter to
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include criminal defense fees, the lower court should not have concluded that such
"extrinsic" evidence clarified the parties' intent in that regard.
C.

Keough's Responses to Plaintiffs' Improperly Leading and Hypothetical
Questions About His Current Interpretation of the Engagement Letters Are
Outside the Scope of His 30(b)(6) Designation and Are Inadmissible
Plaintiffs seek to persuade the Court that their desired interpretation of the Dorsey

engagement letter should prevail as a matter of law because they corralled ClearOne's
former CEO Keough - by way of improperly leading and hypothetical questions - to
agree with their desired interpretation at deposition. However, Plaintiffs' attempt to use a
lay witness to interpret legal engagement letters is unavailing. ClearOne's former CEO
Keough was not aware of whether Marsden had any white collar criminal defense
experience (R. 2733). Indeed, Marsden himself conceded that, as of January 29, 2003
when the Bendinger engagement letter was signed, he had not held himself out as a
white-collar criminal defense attorney, that he was not handling any white-collar criminal
cases, and that the litigation boutique, consisting of 15-22 securities and antitrust
litigators and "utility infielders [attorneys]," by which he was then employed did not (to
his knowledge) have anybody handling a single white-collar criminal case (R. 2725).
Plaintiffs' 30(b)(6) deposition notice sought, inter alia, a deponent to testify about:
10. The circumstances surrounding your negotiation and
execution of ... the 2003 Agreement [i.e., the Bendinger
engagement letter], or the 2004 Agreement [i.e., the Dorsey
engagement letter].
11.
Communications you have had regarding ... the 2003
Agreement, or the 2004 Agreement.
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(R. 1148). ClearOne designated Keough, its former CEO, to testify about the
engagement letters because nobody else could be located who even recalled their
existence (R. 2891, 2892, 2900). Indeed, with respect to the engagement letters, Keough
himself testified that there was no negotiation (R. 2733, 2739), that he signed them (R.
2725, 2729), and that he had no communications with anybody about the engagement
letters (R. 2733, 2739). All that Keough recalls is that someone - either a Board member
or a lawyer from the firm that was originally representing ClearOne in the SEC Action told him that Marsden would be representing Strohm (R. 2734). Significantly, Keough
does not remember any discussion by ClearOne's Board with respect to the scope of
Marsden's retention (R. 2709). The above statements constitute the sum and substance of
Keough's testimony within the scope of the 30(b)(6) designation. See Falchenberg v.
New York State Dep 't ofEduc, 567 F. Supp. 2d 513, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Questions
and answers exceeding the scope of the 30(b)(6) notice will not bind the corporation, but
are merely treated as the answers of the individual deponent.") (citations omitted). Such
testimony certainly does not establish that ClearOne understood that it was somehow
committing itself to pay for Strohm's then non-existent and unforeseeable federal
criminal proceeding.
However, Keough was also noticed to give deposition testimony as a fact witness
(R.2176-77, 2534A-B). As a "fact" witness, Plaintiffs proceeded to ask Keough whether
he agreed with Plaintiffs' desired interpretation of the engagement letters and Keough
generally testified that he did. Such testimony, however - which Plaintiffs quote at
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length and cite frequently - was not within the scope of the subject matters on which
Keough was designated to testify on behalf of ClearOne (Dorsey Br. 12-14, 30, 32, 3435, 48). Specifically, Keough was not designated to testify about his current (or past)
"interpretation" of the engagement letters. Rather, Keough was designated to testify
about the circumstances surrounding the engagement letters' negotiation and execution
and communications about such letters.
Moreover, testimony elicited by improperly leading and hypothetical questions is
inadmissible. See Utah R. Civ. Proc. 32(a) ("upon the hearing of a motion ... any part or
all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the
witness were then present and testifying, may be used") (emphasis added). Here,
Keough's responses to Plaintiffs' improperly leading and hypothetical questions about his
current interpretation of the engagement letters should not have been relied upon by the
lower court:
[Rule of Evidence 611(c)] does not give the calling party an
absolute right to ask leading questions even when the witness
is identified with an adverse party. There may be instances
where, although a witness is identified with the opposing
party, he or she is also identified, because of sympathy or
bias, with the calling party. In such cases the court has
discretion to preclude the use of leading questions to avoid
abuses of the rule.
Gates v. City of Memphis, No. 98-5921, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6713, at *6 (6th Cir.
Apr. 6, 2000); see State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1143 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1989) ("Rule
611(c) is still framed in words of suggestion rather than command, and whether it will be
applied is a matter ultimately left to the discretion of the trial judge."); Woods v.
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Lecureaux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1221 (6m Cir. 1997) ("a district court should be hesitant to
authorize the use of leading questions when it is cross-examination in form only").
Here, Keough revealed bias against ClearOne because he had been involuntarily
relieved of his position as ClearOne's CEO in June 2004 by ClearOne's Chairman due to
unspecified allegations from Keough's former administrative assistant (R. 2705). In view
of Keough's bias, the Court should disregard his sycophantic responses to Plaintiffs'
improperly leading and hypothetical questions, especially those outside the scope of the
30(b)(6) designation.
D.

The True Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Execution of the Dorsey
Engagement Letter Demonstrates that Marsden Was Only Engaged to Finish
Up the Minor Then-Pending Civil Litigations
In fact, a reasoned review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the

execution of Bendinger and Dorsey engagement letters reveals that ClearOne did not
intend to commit itself to using Marsden (or whatever firm he was with at the time) for
any then-hypothetical and unanticipated federal criminal proceeding against Strohm.
First, as of January 2003, Marsden himself was not handling any white-collar
criminal cases and he does not know if anyone at Bendinger was handling a white-collar
criminal case at that time (R. 4030). Bendinger was a civil litigation boutique (R. 4030).
Indeed, Marsden admits that he had not held himself out as a white-collar criminal law
specialist (R. 4030), whereas co-defendant Fran Flood's attorney Max Wheeler "is a
highly visible criminal law specialist" and is "known in the community as a criminal
lawyer" (R. 4030). Significantly, ClearOne's then interim CEO Keough did not know
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whether Marsden had any experience handling criminal matters when he signed the
engagement letters and still does not know anything about Marsden's background (R.
2733). Under these circumstances, it defies logic to believe that ClearOne would
knowingly commit itself to paying for Marsden to defend Strohm in a then-hypothetical
and unanticipated federal criminal proceeding given Marsden's lack of experience and
lack of reputation in the field.
Second, neither Marsden nor anyone else from his firm did much, if any, work in
connection with the federal grand jury proceeding prior to 2007. Marsden himself admits
that there was very little for Bendinger to do because Strohm was not asked to appear
before the grand jury, was not the recipient of a subpoena, and there was no
communication between the U.S. Attorney and the Bendinger firm concerning Strohm
(R. 2917-18, 4038). Indeed, there are only two (2) fleeting references in the Bendinger
invoices to anything even remotely criminal. Specifically, on January 31, 2003, Aaron G.
Murphy recorded that he performed some unspecified research on "criminal liability" and
on April 16, 2003, Murphy recorded that he reviewed a letter from "R. Snow" [from
Clyde Snow, then representing ClearOne] regarding the "AUSA investigation." These
entries do not demonstrate that Bendinger or Marsden even represented Strohm in
connection with the grand jury investigation. Rather, they show that Bendinger did some
research and potentially followed what could be learned about the grand jury
investigation presumably to discern its potential impact on the then-active SEC Action or
other civil litigations involving Strohm.
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Third, by the Fall of 2003, ClearOne did not believe that there was a reasonable
possibility of a criminal proceeding being brought against Strohm and did not believe that
any indictment of Strohm was in the realm of possibilities (R. 5023). Asked at deposition
about whether he was aware in 2003 that there was a "grand jury Department of Justice
investigation ongoing at that point," ClearOne5s representative Jeff Gross responded as
follows:
THE WITNESS:
Not ongoing.
There were some
subpoenas that were issued earlier in the year in 2003, and
then it went quiet.
Q: (By Mr. Hancock) Okay. But it didn't go away; it was
still out there?
A: We thought it had died. I mean, you never get a letter
from the DOJ saying your client is in the clear or, you
know, we're not pursuing this any further. But from
communications with the U.S. Attorney's office, we got
the sense that they were not going to pursue anything.
That was the impression that we formed in 2003, in the
summer and fall of 2003.
R. 5020 (emphasis added). In fact, ClearOne made a decision to file a lawsuit against
ClearOne's Directors and Officers liability carriers for rescinding the Company's
insurance policies in the face of the SEC's allegations and would not have done so if
ClearOne thought there was a reasonable possibility of a criminal proceeding (R. 2895,
5023). In view of the foregoing, Plaintiffs' attempt to suggest that the federal grand jury
investigation was actively "ongoing" at the time of the March 31, 2004 Dorsey
engagement letter is without support in the record.
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Fourth, and perhaps more revealing, Marsden himself did not disclose the
existence of a federal grand jury investigation involving his "major client" Strohm when
he completed the "Dorsey Conflicts and Screening Report" form on January 5, 2004 at
the time he was considering switching firms (R. 2881-2885). Tellingly, although
Marsden listed the "Securities and Exchange Commission" as an adverse party and
disclosed the SEC Action and other civil litigations as "files on which [he is] currently
representing these [major] clients," Marsden did not list the U.S. Department of Justice or
the U.S. Attorney as an adverse party and did not disclose the existence of the grand jury
investigation as a "file" on which he was currently representing Strohm (id.). Indeed,
Marsden admitted at deposition that the first thing that led him to believe that Strohm
might actually be criminally charged was when he was called by Assistant U.S. Attorney
Steward "Stu" Walz in April or May 2007 and informed that Strohm was a target of the
unexpectedly reopened grand jury investigation (R. 4037).
Fifth, at the time Marsden switched firms, there was very little work left to be
done on the SEC Action or "Related Proceedings." The SEC Action had been settled and
was only awaiting final approval from Washington. The shareholder class actions and
derivative proceedings had either been dismissed, withdrawn, or were in the process of
settling. In fact, ClearOne paid Dorsey less than $15,000 in 2004 and 2005 to wrap up
the then-pending civil litigations (see R. 2549.). Thus, the factual context in which the
Dorsey engagement letter was presented to ClearOne involved a clear trajectory of civil
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litigation that was winding down and in the process of ending. Nobody - not even
Marsden - reasonably anticipated that Strohm would be criminally indicted.
Sixth, when Marsden first learned of the reopened grand jury investigation, he
asked ClearOne to acknowledge that the grand jury proceeding was covered by Strohm's
ETA. The Dorsey engagement letter was not raised or discussed at that time (R. 2696).
When the issue of the Bendinger and Dorsey engagement letters was first raised in
William Michael's letter to ClearOne's CFO Greg A. LeClaire dated November 8, 2007
(R. 2870), ClearOne responded that "the retainer agreements governed the SEC
complaint and not the current U.S. Department of Justice action" (R. 2874).
In any event, Keough's testimony on the scope of the Dorsey engagement letter
was contradictory. Even while generally agreeing to Plaintiffs' desired interpretation of
the Dorsey engagement letter, Keough admitted that by signing it, he did not intend to
give any rights to Strohm in addition to what she received in her ETA (R. 2739).
Strohm's ETA, however, promises only "indemnification" subject to various limitations
imposed by Utah law and ClearOne's bylaws (R.35-40). Furthermore, according to
Keough, when he signed the Dorsey engagement letter, he did not believe he was
agreeing to provide anything more than Strohm had received in the ETA (R.2723).
In sum, the facts and circumstances surrounding the execution of the Dorsey
engagement letter reveal that ClearOne intended only to authorize Marsden to wind up
and finish the existing SEC civil action and then-pending "Related Proceedings."
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Dorsey's representation of Strohm in a then-hypothetical and unanticipated federal
criminal proceeding was simply not contemplated.
E.

Keough's Testimonial Responses to Objectionable Leading Questions
Allegedly Designed to Have Him Recall What He Understood Years Ago
About Legal Document Where the Risk of Supplying a False Memory for a
Disgruntled Witness Is So Great Should Have Been Disregarded
In addition to the significant time gap of Keough's testimony (testimony regarding

events which happened six to seven years before the deposition), the dangers of accepting
as true responses to leading questions from a "friendly" witness are well known:
The "essential test of a leading question is whether it so
suggests to the witness the specific tenor of the reply desired
by counsel that such a reply is likely to be given irrespective
of an actual memory. The evil to be avoided is that of
supplying a false memory for the witness." [United States v.
Durham, 319 F.2d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1963).] The restrictions
against leading questions are "designed to guard against the
risk of improper suggestion inherent in examining friendly
witnesses through the use of leading questions." [Ellis v.
Chicago, 667 F.2d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 1981).]
4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 611.06[2][zl at 611-59 (2ded. 2009) (emphasis
added) ("What Constitutes Leading Question / Tenor of Desired Reply"). Indeed, the
dangers of leading questions are so great that the court always retains the discretion to
limit their use:
Leading questions must not be allowed in controverted
substantive areas in which the jury must weigh the evidence
and make credibility determinations.' "[AJny good trial
advocate who is allowed leading questions can both testify for
the witness and argue the client's case by the use of leading
questions. This practice must not be allowed." [Stine v.
Marathon Oil Co., 976 F.2d 254, 266 (5th Cir. 1992).] * * * *
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When the witness is biased in favor of the cross-examiner, the same danger
of leading questions arises as on direct, and the court may, in its discretion,
prohibit their use. [U.S. v. Hall 165 F.3d 1095, 1117 (7th Cir. 1999).]2
4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence $ 611.06[4], at 611-64 (2d ed. 2009) (emphasis added)
("Right to Ask Leading Questions Not Absolute").
In addition, although Keough was not asked at his deposition whether he had any
animus or bias against ClearOne, he did, however, testify about the circumstances of his
departure from ClearOne:
Q.
... And how long did you remain as the CEO of ClearOne?
A.
Until about June of 2004.
Q.
And why did you — did you leave ClearOne?
A.
I was relieved by Dal Bagley, the chairman.
Q.
And when you say "relieved," was this something where you did not
voluntarily step down?
A.
Oh, no, I did not voluntarily step down.
Q.
What was your understanding as to why you were relieved as the
CEO by Dal Bagley?
A.
Well, you know, I was never specifically told, but I did know it
revolved around my administrative assistant having returned after being on
medical leave for six months.
Q.
And what—
A.
Well, it was quite shocking to me, quite frankly, because I had never
had an issue with my admin. And she, six months prior - since you asked,
she called in one day at HR and said she had a death in the family and was
going to San Diego and wouldn't be in. The following day she called in
and said she was going into rehab. And on the last day of her six month
leave that's apparently allowed, she surfaced and made some allegations. I
was never actually told what they were. Never knew what it was about.
But Dal decided that, okay, that was going to be that.

2

While the proper interpretation of the Dorsey engagement letter is a legal question for
the Court, Plaintiffs' leading questions were asked in the context of a hotly controverted
substantive area requiring the weighing of evidence and possible credibility
determinations.
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(R. 2705). Based on the foregoing testimony, the only conclusion that can be made is
that Keough still feels that he was wrongfully ousted from his CEO position at ClearOne.
While business protocol may require that he address questions about letters he signed 6-7
years earlier on behalf of ClearOne, it does not require that he necessarily disagree with
the legal position of a current claimant - and former co-worker - against the company
that he views as having wrongfully ousted him. Thus, Keough's animus against
ClearOne is a proper basis for precluding the use of leading questions on controverted
substantive issues. Accordingly, the lower court erred in relying on Keough's testimony
resulting from such improper leading questions. At a minimum, Keough's bias and
credibility must be determined in open court.
VI.
AN 18% INTEREST RATE IN AN ATTORNEY ENGAGEMENT LETTER
Is UNREASONABLE AND THUS UNENFORCEABLE AS A MATTER OF UTAH
PUBLIC POLICY AS DEFINED IN THE UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Throughout its brief, Dorsey disregards its status as attorneys and refuses to
acknowledge that attorneys are governed by higher standards as set forth in the Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.5(a) prohibits lawyers from charging an
"unreasonable fee." The district court abused its discretion by applying the
unconscionability standard derived from the ordinary commercial context (R. 2966,
5160-61). Since attorneys are and should be held to the standards set forth in the Rules of
Professional Conduct - which differs markedly from commercial agreements - an 18%
interest rate in an attorney engagement letter is per se unreasonable.
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When attorneys fees are involved, lawyers owe their clients and third-party payors
a higher duty:
Courts are concerned to protect clients, particularly those who
are unsophisticated in matters of lawyers' compensation,
when a lawyer has overreached. Information about fees for
legal services is often difficult for prospective clients to
obtain. Many clients do not bargain effectively because of
their need and inexperience. The services required are often
unclear beforehand and difficult to monitor as a lawyer
provides them. Lawyers usually encourage their clients to
trust them. Lawyers, therefore, owe their clients greater
duties than are owed under the general law of contracts.
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 34 ("A lawyer may not charge a
fee larger than is reasonable in the circumstances or that is prohibited by law."), cmt. b
(2000). See id. § 14, cmt. i ("In some situations, lawyers owe duties to nonclients
resembling those owed to clients. ... What duties are owed can be determined only by
close analysis of the circumstances and the relevant law and policies.").
While Dorsey repeatedly points out that ClearOne is not its client, it refuses to
acknowledge that it owes ClearOne - as the purported primary if not exclusive payor of
its fees - at least as much disclosure about its fees as it owes to Strohm, consistent with
preservation of the attorney-client privilege. While ClearOne regularly sought more
detailed information from Dorsey about the scope of its activities in an attempt to
determine whether Dorsey's fees were reasonable, Dorsey routinely refused to provide
such information by asserting the attorney-client privilege (R.2868-70; 4102-7).
Throughout the course of its representation, however, Dorsey never sought to impose any
interest on ClearOne - that is, until it brought its collection action.
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Significantly, the Restatement imposes a "reasonable client" standard of
construction on attorney engagement letters:
A tribunal should construe a contract between client and
lawyer as a reasonable person in the circumstances of the
client would have construed it.
Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 18(2) (2000). The purpose of this
rule is to "protect clients against unfair contracts and interpretations of them." Id. § 18,
cmt. b.
If it is true that "18% interest is an extremely common interest rate in collection
matters in the state of Utah" - as the district court found (R. 5161) - then the Court
should declare such a high rate unenforceable as unreasonable and unfair to the client
and/or third-party payor as a matter of Utah public policy. Public trust in the state bar
requires no less. Moreover, in this case, the unfairness is compounded by the fact that the
18% interest rate was not actually set forth in the Dorsey engagement letter, which also
does not specify which terms of the Bendinger engagement letter were sought to be
incorporated by reference.
Dorsey contends that because Keough testified at his deposition that the interest
rate was proper, that testimony binds ClearOne (Dorsey Br. 48). Keough's testimony on
his current legal interpretation of the Dorsey engagement letter is non-binding on
ClearOne. It defies common sense to believe that Keough remembered the 18% interest
rate term from the January 29, 2003 Bendinger engagement letter on March 31, 2004
(when he signed the Dorsey letter) and that he intended for just that term to be carried
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over from the Bendinger engagement letter to the Dorsey engagement letter. More
importantly, however, the facts show that Keough, who admittedly had authority to sign
the agreement on behalf of ClearOne, did not bear the benefits of ClearOne's "teams of
attorneys" and that he neither had, nor believed he had, the opportunity for meaningful
negotiation of the terms of Marsden's engagement letters. See Bekins Bar VRanch v.
Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1983) (listing the lack of opportunity for
meaningful negotiation and the use of boilerplate provisions as factors bearing on
substantive unconscionability).
ClearOne has previously shown in its main brief that the two engagement letters
are stand-alone agreements - one setting forth the Bendinger terms and the other setting
forth the Dorsey terms - without any incorporation by reference. See ClearOne Br. 2628. Indeed, no client would be reasonably apprised that just those two highly prejudicial
and controversial terms would be incorporated by reference by Marsden's use of the term
"update." Any attempt to incorporate terms from another document must clearly
communicate both the express terms and the intent to incorporate them into the document
at issue. While the Dorsey engagement letter references the Bendinger engagement
letter, it does not clearly or expressly communicate that the purpose of the reference is to
incorporate terms from the Bendinger engagement letter into the Dorsey engagement
letter.
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VII.

DORSEY'S CROSS-APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED

Dorsey challenges the district court's rulings that: (1) ClearOne has no obligation
to pay Dorsey's post-verdict fees (R. 5153-54); (2) expressly imposed August 10, 2010 as
the last date for which Dorsey could seek to recover fees and costs in its collection case
(R. 5176), and (3) rejected Dorsey's request for 18% interest on its collection case
(R. 5180). While ClearOne's appeal evidences its own disagreements with the district
court's rulings, at a minimum, the district court did not commit error in connection with
the above rulings.
A.

At a Minimum, Strohm's Conduct Failures Prohibit ClearOne from Paying
Post-Verdict Fees Incurred Solely Because of Her Perjury Conviction
While the district court held that there is "no absolute public policy bar to

ClearOne's indemnification or reimbursement of Susie Strohm's fees" (R. 5152)
(emphasis added), it did recognize a public policy restriction on Dorsey's entitlement to
fees pursuant to its engagement letter:
This Court does not reject out of hand the possibility that a
partial conviction might in some cases defeat or substantially
reduce a fee award. For example, Ms. Strohm was charged
with seven counts of securities fraud. These were very
serious counts, and they suggested conduct not in any way
consistent with the best interest of the corporation. Had
Ms. Strohm been convicted of one or more counts of
securities fraud, ClearOne's argument that public policy
should bar indemnification or reimbursement of fees and
expenses would have considerable force. The one perjury
conviction, standing apart from the securities fraud
allegations, and coming later in time, does not carry the same
force or public policy concern. While the Court reiterates that
Ms. Strohm should not receive fees related to the single count
upon which she was convicted, this Court is persuaded that
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based on the overall success of her defense, and her complete
vindication of any securities fraud charges, it would be
inconsistent with both the indemnification statutes for
officers, and the engagement agreements, to allow ClearOne
to avoid both a statutory responsibility and a contractual
obligation it voluntarily incurred.
(R. 5153). In Point II above, ClearOne argues that Strohm's perjury conviction also
demonstrates conduct inconsistent with ClearOne's best interests, thus prohibiting any
use of ClearOne's corporate funds. While the district court did not adopt ClearOne's
total prohibition argument, it did adopt ClearOne's public policy argument insofar as
Strohm was convicted of perjury:
ClearOne Does Not Have Any Present Obligation to Pay Fees
And/Or Costs Incurred by Dorsey in Behalf of Ms. Strohm
Following her Conviction on the Single Perjury Count
Ms. Strohm has no present obligation to reimburse ClearOne
for fees and costs related to the perjury count before
conviction ..., even if the proportion attributable to that count
can be established. On the other hand, now that there has
been a conviction on the one count, from the date of that jury
verdict ClearOne shall not be held liable, at this time, to pay
Ms. Strohm's fees and expenses in the criminal case postFebruary 27, 2009, all of which must be attributed to the
perjury count.
However, in the event Ms. Strohm is
ultimately exonerated on that sole count, her claim will then
arise for reimbursement for all reasonable and necessary fees
and expenses.
(R. 5153-54). Now that the Tenth Circuit has affirmed Strohm's perjury conviction, U.S.
v. Strohm, 2011 WL 5346069, at *1, *12 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 2011), the district court's
ruling means that ClearOne has no obligation - present or future - to pay Dorsey's postverdict fees or costs in the criminal case. Dorsey takes issue with this holding, and
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implicitly contends that there can be no public policy limitations on its engagement letter
with ClearOne and Strohm (Dorsey Br. 58).
Although the district court's reasoning is not fully spelled out in its decision, the
district court effectively held that Dorsey cannot enforce its engagement letter with
respect to services rendered after Strohm's perjury conviction because all such services
relate to the perjury count on which Strohm indisputably did not meet the requisite
standard of conduct. Dorsey's contention that the district court's public policy limitation
on its engagement letter constitutes an "abuse of discretion" (Dorsey Br. 58) is erroneous,
for all of the reasons set forth in Point II above. While ClearOne believes that Strohm's
failure to meet the standard of conduct prohibits it from paying any of Dorsey's fees
based on Utah public policy as set forth in the Revised Business Corporation Act, at a
minimum, Strohm's conduct failure prohibits ClearOne from paying post-verdict fees
incurred solely because of her perjury conviction.
B.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Determining That
Dorsey's Reasonable Fees in the Collection Case Needed to Stop as of August
10,2010
Dorsey takes issue with the district court's express cutoff of collection case fees as

of August 10, 2010, calling it "arbitrary" (Dorsey Br. 59). However, the district court has
discretion to determine Dorsey's reasonable fees in the aggregate. Having concluded that
"the ever accruing charges must stop at some point" and that he was troubled by the
"overall costs of this litigation" (R. 5175-76), the district court certainly did not abuse its
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discretion by determining that Dorsey's reasonable fees needed to stop as of August 10,
2010.
C.

The District Court Did Not Err by Concluding that Dorsey's Civil Fees to
Collect on Its Own Engagement Letter Were Not Billed in Connection with
the SEC Civil Case or Any Related Litigation
Lastly, Dorsey takes issue with the district court's conclusions that "[t]he letter

agreements do not include an interest provision that applies to the collection case" and
that "[t]he contractual rate [of 18%] applies only to amounts billed in the criminal case,
and unpaid after thirty days" (R. 5180). Aside from the foregoing arguments, the
Bendinger engagement letter purports to impose an 18% interest rate on amounts billed in
connection with the SEC civil complaint uand in connection with further related
investigations and litigation" and unpaid after 30 days (R. 42). The district court did not
act arbitrarily by concluding that Dorsey's alleges fees in connection with its own
engagement letter claim do not constitute amounts billed in connection with the SEC civil
complaint or further related investigations and litigation.
Accordingly, Dorsey's cross-appeal should be dismissed as meritless
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CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, ClearOne respectfully requests that the Judgment
of the district court be vacated in its entirety. Specifically, the award of 18% and civil
attorney fees and costs should be vacated and, at a minimum, the criminal attorney fees
and costs should be reduced to reflect Utah rates.
DATED this 21 st day of February, 2012.
MAGMEBY|& GREENWOOD, P.C.

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee
ClearOne Communications Inc.
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